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Why US Senators obstruct some executive agency nominations
over others
The average delay between an executive nomination and confirmation by the US Senate is 120
days, but some nominees can experience delays of more than 400 or 500 days. In new research
which examines over 8,000 bureaucratic nominations over 25 years, Ian Ostrander finds that
nominations are targeted for delay based on their policy value, public importance, and the
perceived ideology of the agency in question. For example, important agencies with low public
importance, such as the Federal Election Commission, are often targeted by Senators for
nomination delays.
The US Senate does not have a reputation for rapid action, and the pace at which it evaluates and confirms
presidential nominations to fill the highest levels of the American bureaucracy is no exception.  In fact, the crippling
delay of executive nominations to bureaucratic posts has become a common occurrence in US politics and has
even caused the shutdown of a key agency.  Relying upon an increasingly “ do nothing” Congress, it may be no
surprise that Presidents have become frustrated with the slowing pace of confirmation shown in Figure 1. 
However, evidence suggests that nominations are not simply casualties of a lethargic legislature; rather some
nominations are targeted for obstruction based on a partisan strategy of denying presidents influence over
bureaucratic decision-making.
Figure 1 – Nomination Delay within Congresses & Presidential Terms 
Note:  Data include over 8,000 cases coded from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/nomis.html. 
The included trend line is a Lowess smoother.
By strategically targeting delay, the effects of obstruction become more potent.  While the average delay may be
just over 120 days within a given Congress, an individual nominee may experience delays of over 400 or 500
days.  In the face of such significant obstruction, nominees may simply decide to quit .  Furthermore, at the end of
every Congress, unconfirmed nominations fail automatically and must be re-nominated.  When long delays are
clustered within a particular agency, it leads to high vacancy rates that can change the character and capacity of
an organization as it continues to operate without a full complement of officials.
Why are some nominations obstructed while other, seemingly similar nominations proceed without difficulty? 
When partisan delay is the motive, some nominations are worth far more than others.    In new research looking at
over 8,000 bureaucratic executive nominations between 1987 and 2012, I find support for the expectation that
nominations are targeted for delay based on their policy value, public salience, and agency characteristics such
as perceived ideology.
Perhaps the most valuable nominations to obstruct are those to major independent regulatory commissions like
the National Labor Relations Board or the Federal Election Commission.  Such commissions typically have a
small board of about five members with both quorum requirements (meaning three of five board members must
exist in order to make rulings) as well as party balancing rules ensuring that no one party can control an entire
board.  Because of their small size, influencing even just one board member can have a dramatic effect on the
outcomes of board decisions.  As such, these posts are critical.
Another closely related consideration is public attention.  Few people are interested in the appointment of
independent regulatory commissioners while many people care about cabinet-level appointments such as the
Secretary of Defense or an Attorney General.  While cabinet secretaries may thus seem like the ideal targets of
delay, such positions are in part protected from obstruction by their very notoriety.  Presidents are much more
willing to engage in public appeals in order to further a cabinet secretary’s nomination in ways that they are not
likely to do for a lower level position.  Similarly, Senate leaders are more inclined to spend valuable floor time
working towards the confirmation of a more salient position.  As such, positions of low public salience are more
likely to face obstruction.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of nominations remaining unconfirmed in the Senate by how many days have
passed since a nomination has occurred.  These results are divided by the level of an appointment with just major
independent commissioners, low-level nominations, and cabinet-level nominees shown.  The results demonstrate
that major independent commissions do in fact take the most time to confirm (with about 20 percent remaining
unconfirmed after 350 days) while cabinet-level nominations are the fastest (with nearly all nominations complete
after 150 days).  Low-level appointments, with neither much public attention nor policy influence, are in between
these two more extreme cases.
Figure 2 – Delay by Level of Appointments between 1987 and 2012
Note:  Cases coded by author from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/nomis.html.  Curves
represent Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival rates for each given appointment tier.
Agency ideology is also an important consideration.  When a position is vacant within an executive bureaucracy,
that role is often filled by a career civil servant.  As bureaucracies tend to develop their own cultures over time,
they may also develop a reputation as being either more conservative or liberal ideologically.  For example, the
Environmental Protection Agency is viewed as liberal while the Department of Defense tends to be viewed as
more conservative.  Knowing these pre-dispositions, presidents will often try to control  these biases by placing
more appointees within agencies of the opposite ideology.  Within my study, I also find that opposition senators
tend to counter this strategy by obstructing nominations to their allied agencies in order to thwart presidential
control.
Combined, these findings suggest that opposition party members within the Senate are targeting a president’s
nominees for obstruction in order to achieve policy gains.  By keeping a president’s nominees off of major
commissions and by protecting allied agencies from presidential influence, senators may divert the stream of
agency policymaking towards their own ideal.  Such power, however, is not absolute.  High salience positions are
less likely to face crippling delay.  As such, senators target vulnerable nominees who have policy relevance but
little public salience.  By targeting these mid-level nominees, the agencies are not so much headless as “neck-
less.”
Given these levels of partisan obstruction, it is perhaps no surprise that in 2013 the Senate used the “ Nuclear
Option” in order to change the rules to make obstruction more difficult.  However, because there is simply not
enough time within a Congress to overcome obstruction on every nomination, Senate leaders will still be forced to
prioritize nominations.  As such, the inter-branch battle over executive nominations is expected to continue for the
foreseeable future.
This article is based on the paper, ‘The Logic of Collective Inaction: Senatorial Delay in Executive Nominations’ , in
American Journal of Political Science.
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